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DIVERSITY IN HIGHER EDUCATION: THE CONSIDERATION 
Of RACE IN HIRING UNIVERSITY FACULTY 
Suzanne E. Eckes' 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The U.S. Supreme Court firmly established that a diverse student 
body is a compelling state interest in Regents of the University of 
California v. Bakke, 1 Grutter v. Bollinger,2 and Gratz v. Bollinger.3 The 
answer, however, to whether a diverse faculty constitutes a compelling 
interest remains unclear. This paper explores whether the arguments 
used in student body diversity cases may extend to university faculty 
diversity as a compelling state interest. Race-conscious faculty affirmative 
action programs require different legal considerations depending on 
whether the programs aim to achieve university faculty diversity or to 
remedy past discrimination. 
Race-conscious affirmative action cases reviewed by the Supreme 
Court can be divided into the following three categories: the 
consideration of race for diversity purposes, including viewpoint 
diversity; the consideration of race to correct racial imbalance; and the 
consideration of race to remedy past discrimination. In the context of 
higher education, the cases focused on student body diversity. In the 
context of employment, the cases generally focused on remedying past 
discrimination. 4 
In order to examine diversity, remedial interest, and racial balance 
arguments in race-conscious affirmative action programs for hiring 
faculty, an analysis of several key race-conscious student admissions and 
employment cases is necessary. Specifically, before Bakke, Grutter, and 
Gratz, there were a series of public employment affirmative action cases 
that addressed past discrimination and racial imbalance. These cases 
provide guidance to institutions seeking to use race as a factor in hiring 
faculty members. After comparing the diversity rationale cases with the 
· Stozanne F. Eckes, ).ll., Ph.D. is an assistant professor in Educational Leadership and Policy Studies 
at Indiana University. The author would like to thank Martha McCarthy and Erica Christie f(>r their 
helpful comments on this paper. 
1. Regents of" the U. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (19/H). 
2. Grutter v. Bollirzger, 5.>9 U.S. 306 (2003). 
3. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003). 
4. Some employment cases have addressed racial balancing as well as past discrimination. 
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remedial interest rationale cases, this paper discusses other decisions that 
focus specifically on race and faculty hiring. Based upon these analyses, 
this paper concludes with an exploration of policy arguments concerning 
whether race should be considered in hiring faculty. 
II. SUPREME COURT RACE-BASED CASES: WHAT STANDARD OF REVIEW Is 
APPLIED? 
The Court applies one of three standards when considering the 
constitutionality of a government action, with strict scrutiny being the 
most difficult standard to satisfy.5 When considering race in the context 
of employment or education, race-conscious policies are subject to strict 
scrutiny in Equal Protection Clause cases.6 The government must show 
that the action is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest. 7 
For example, when hiring university faculty for remedial reasons, the 
university must demonstrate a compelling state interest in remedying the 
impact of past discrimination and show the hiring plan is narrowly 
tailored to remedy the impact of the past discrimination.8 Likewise, in 
using race as a criterion to achieve faculty diversity, a university must 
demonstrate that a diverse faculty is a compelling state interest and then 
establish that the race-conscious plan is narrowly tailored to achieve the 
goal of diversity.9 
III. STUDENT BODY DIVERSITY CASES: DO THESE DECISIONS EXTEND TO 
FACULTY DIVERSITY? 
Since 1978, institutions of higher education have relied upon Justice 
Powell's opinion in Bakke to justify faculty and student diversity 
programs. This reliance on Bakke has increased due to the recent Grutter 
and Gratz decisions. Although the Supreme Court solely addressed the 
issue of student diversity in these cases, some scholars contend the 
holdings extend to faculty diversity because the decisions contain no 
language restricting this issue to the student body. 10 
5. See generally Kathleen M. Sullivan & Gerald Gunther, Constitutional Law, 605-55 (14th 
ed., found. Press 2001 ). 
6. Id. 
7. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200,227 (1995). 
8. See Suzanne E. Eckes, Race-Conscious Admissions Programs: Where Do Universities Go 
from Gratz and Grutter? 33 j.L. & Educ. 21,23 (2004). 
9. Id. 
10. See )oint Statement of Constitutional Law Scholars, Reaffirming Diversity: A Legal Analysis 
of the University of' Michigan Affirmative Actions Cases 22-25 (Civ. Rights Project at Harv. U. 2003) 
[hereinafter joint Statement]. 
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The Supreme Court recognized that a diverse student body is a 
compelling state interest in Bakke. 11 Here, the University of California at 
Davis Medical School reserved a specific number of admissions slots for 
minority students. 12 The Supreme Court struck down the affirmative 
action plan, holding that the use of a quota, or reserving a certain 
number of seats for minorities, was unconstitutional. 13 Although the 
Court found the University's race-conscious admissions plan was 
unconstitutional, Justice Powell's plurality opinion held that California's 
interest in maintaining a diverse student body was sufficiently 
compelling. 14 Justice Powell stated that a diverse student body "is a 
constitutionally permissible goal for an institution of higher 
education." 15 
Despite the Bakke opinion, universities had insufficient guidance as 
to what extent race could be used in admissions or in faculty hiring. 
Several courts relied on Justice Powell's concept of the use of race as one 
of many factors, or as a plus factor, in university admissions. 16 Some 
courts even extended Justice Powell's approach to employment-
including faculty hiring. 17 The difficulty interpreting Bakke's approved 
consideration of race as a plus factor was subsequently resolved in 
Grutter and Gratz. 
In Grutter v. Bollinger, the Supreme Court confirmed Justice Powell's 
holding that student body diversity is a compelling state interest, and 
therefore, race could be used in university admissions. 18 In Grutter, the 
majority reasoned Bakke emphasized a "[s]tate has a substantial interest 
that legitimately may be served by a properly devised admissions 
program involving the competitive consideration of race and ethnic 
origin." 19 The majority noted that "numerous studies show that student 
body diversity promotes learning outcomes, and 'better prepares students 
for an increasingly diverse workforce and society, and better prepares 
11. 438 U.S. at 310-12. 
12. I d. at 289. 
13. Jd. at 289-99. 
14. Jd. at 310-12. 
15. Jd. at 311-12. 
16. See DeRonde v. Regents of the U. of Cal., 625 P.2d 220,224-25 (Cal. 1981); McDonald v. 
Hogness, 598 P.2d 707,712 (Wash. 1979). 
17. See Higgins v. Vallejo, 823 F.2d 352, 357-59 (9th Cir. 1987) (relying on justice Powell's 
Bakke rationale); U. & Community College Sys. of Nev. v. Farmer, 930 P.2d 730,734-35 (Nev. 1997) 
(treating justice Powell's opinion in Bakke as the decision of the Court). 
18. 539 U.S. at 322-23. The Court also recognized justice Powell's opinion had served as the 
"touchstone for constitutional analysis" of affirmative action programs in universities across the 
country. Jd. at 323. 
19. Jd. at 322-323 (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 320). 
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them as professionals."'20 The Court also concluded that the benefits of 
diversity "are not theoretical but real, as major American businesses have 
made clear that the skills needed in today's increasingly global 
marketplace can only be developed through exposure to widely diverse 
people, cultures, ideas, and viewpoints."21 
After the Court reasoned that diversity was compelling and that race 
could be used as a factor, it next addressed whether the University of 
Michigan Law School's program was narrowly tailored.22 The Court 
noted that "[w]hen race-based action is necessary to further a compelling 
governmental interest, such action does not violate the constitutional 
guarantee of equal protection so long as the narrow-tailoring 
requirement is also satisfied."23 Because of the holistic-or many 
factored-approach to selecting the student body, the University of 
Michigan's affirmative action plan was deemed narrowly tailored.24 This 
holistic approach was quite different from the quota system used in 
Bakke. 25 
In contrast to the Law School's program in Grutter, in Gratz the 
admissions program automatically distributed 20 points to every 
applicant from an "underrepresented minority" group. 26 In the written 
statement, the Court stressed Justice Powell's reasoning in Bakke would 
not permit "any single characteristic" to automatically ensure an 
"identifiable contribution to a university's diversity,"27 but rather called 
for individual consideration.28 Unlike the admissions program in 
Grutter, the undergraduate program in Gratz did not individually 
consider the students.29 Accordingly, the Court held that the 
undergraduate affirmative action policy was not narrowly tailored and 
therefore violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, Title VI, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981.30 
A well-reasoned argument can be made to extend the Court's student 
body diversity holdings to faculty diversity contexts. 31 It is important to 
20. !d. at 330 (quoting Br. for Am. Educ. Research Assoc. as Amici Curiae at .l (feb. IH, 2003) 
(available at 2003 WL 398292)). 
21. I d. at 330-331. 
22. Id. at 333-43. 
23. Id. at 327. 
24. !d. at 338-343. 
25. Sceid at337-3R. 
26. 539 U.S. at 270. 
27. Id. at 271. 
28. /d. at 270-75. 
29. !d. 
30. /d. at 275. 
31. See jonathan Alger, When Color-Blind Is Color-Bland: Ensuring Faculty Diversity in 
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note that Grutter and Gratz focused on diversity and not the remedial 
interest argument. Bakke, Grutter, and Gratz offer strong language 
supporting governmental interest in both student body and faculty 
diversity. 32 In Bakke, the Court noted that student body diversity would 
lead to "the robust exchange of ideas."33 Arguably, this concept could be 
applied to the robust exchange of ideas between both faculty and 
students and faculty and faculty. The Grutter Court held that "[i]n order 
to cultivate a set ofleaders with legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry, it is 
necessary that the path to leadership be visibly open to talented and 
qualified individuals of every race and ethnicity."34 This concept could 
also be applied to university faculty. 
The Joint Statement of Constitutional Law Scholars35 argues that 
"[o]ne of the benefits of student body diversity identified by the Grutter 
Court is the development of a diverse and integrated leadership that can 
serve the needs of government, business, and the military."30 In other 
words, a diverse faculty can help create a network of future leaders in all 
academic disciplines. Additionally, the Joint Statement noted that 
The Grutter Court stressed that context is critical in strict scrutiny 
analysis, and the Court may be more inclined to uphold race-conscious 
policies in employment contexts that closely parallel the higher 
education context, where the benefits of diversity in the workplace are 
welldocumented [sic] and race is used as a "plus" factor in a non-
mechanical hiring or promotion process that also considers non-racial 
factors and allows applicants to compete for jobs on an equal footing. 37 
By considering race as one of many factors and by using research to 
document the benefits of faculty diversity, a plan may be considered 
narrowly tailored. 
The University's educational judgment regarding diversity and its 
educational mission were honored by the Court in Grutter:'8 The Court 
stated: "Our holding today is in keeping with our tradition of giving a 
degree of deference to a university's academic decisions, within 
constitutionally prescribed limits. "39 This deference arguably relates to 
the academic freedoms under the First Amendment, including who may 
Higher Education, 10 Stan. L. & Policy Rev. 191 (1999); see also, Joint Statement, supra n. iO at 22-25 
(arguing that the Michigan affirmative action decisions could extend to facultv diversity). 
32. See joint Statement, supra n. 10 at 22-25. 
33. 438 U.S. at 311-13. 
34. 539 U.S. at 332. 
35. )oint Statement, supra n.10. 
36. !d. at 24. 
37. !d. at 25. 
38. 539 U.S. at 328. 
39. Id. 
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teach, what may be taught, and who may be admitted to study.40 In 
permitting this flexibility, the Court noted that '"good faith' on the part 
of a university is 'presumed' absent 'a showing to the contrary."'41 
Moreover, under Executive Order, universities receiving federal 
money are required "to take affirmative action" regarding race as an 
employment factor. 42 The Supreme Court has not interpreted either the 
Constitution or Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to prohibit race-
conscious hiring to promote faculty diversityY Indeed, until the 
Supreme Court specifically decides whether a diverse faculty is a 
compelling interest, one could infer that Bakke, Grutter, and Gratz 
permit universities to consider race in hiring faculty. 
IV. PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT CASES: Do THESE DECISIONS INCLUDE 
FACULTY SELECTION REMEDIAL PROGRAMS? 
Remedying past discrimination has been recognized under existing 
case law to support race-conscious hiring if such programs are narrowly 
tailored. Before Grutter and Gratz, the Court decided a series of cases in 
which a divided Court addressed the constitutionality of various race-
conscious employment programs. Although the majority of these cases 
were not specifically focused on faculty diversity, it is necessary to 
explore the reasoning used by the Court in some of these public 
employment cases to understand the Court's reasoning regarding the use 
of race-conscious programs for remedial purposes. In addition to the 
Equal Protection argument present in Grutter and Gratz, within the 
employment context, Title VII is often at issue. Title VII does not 
consider affirmative action as discrimination if the affirmative action 
plan is considered valid.44 It is important to note that an employer 
aftlrmative action plan that focuses on a remedial purpose has only been 
considered valid under Title VII.45 Diversity, on the other hand, has just 
been developed as a valid reason under Title VII for adopting an 
aftlrmative action plan.46 
40. Patrick Linehan, Guarding the Dumping Ground: Equal Protection, Title VII and Justifying 
the Usc of Race in the Hiring a( Special Educators, 2001 BYU Educ. & L.j. 179, 199 (200 1 ). 
41. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330. 
42. Exec. Or. No. 11246, 3 C.P.R. 339 (1965) (reprinted as amended in 1 Affirmative Action 
Compl. Man. for F. Contractors (BNA) 101, 101). 
43. See Alger, supra n. 31 at 193. 
44. Moniquc C. Lillard, Deborah C:. Malamud, Miranda Oshige McGowan, Charles A. 
Shanor, The Effect of the University of Michigan Cases on Affirmative Action in Employment, 8 
Employee Rights & Empl. Policy). 127, 136 (2004). 
45. Id. al 136-37. 
46. Lillard ct al., supra n. 44. 
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One of the earlier cases to address under-representation of minority 
employees was United Steelworkers of America v. W eberY In this case, 
the Supreme Court held that race-conscious plans may be used in job 
categories in which minorities are traditionally underrepresented. 48 In 
Weber, a collective bargaining agreement established a race-conscious 
training program for unskilled minority workers.49 The training program 
reserved 50 percent of the spots for minority workers. 5° The Supreme 
Court held that such a plan was permissible to eradicate racial 
discrimination,51 but a plan establishing rigid racial placement would be 
impermissible. 52 It is important to note that Weber was a Title VII case. 
As such, the court used a different test from the strict scrutiny test 
applied in Equal Protection cases. Some of the other employment cases 
discussed employed this different test for the same reasons. 
Fullilove v. Klutznick53 is another employment case that 
demonstrates the Supreme Court's analysis of a race-conscious decision 
to remedy past discrimination. In this case, the Supreme Court examined 
the Public Works Employment Act enacted by Congress for minority 
business enterprises. 54 The Court upheld, under a lesser degree of 
scrutiny, the congressionally created affirmative action program that set 
aside l 0 percent of government business for minority-owned 
businesses. 55 
Similar reasoning was applied six years later in Local 28 of Sheet 
Metal Workers International Association v. EEOC, when the Supreme 
Court suggested that the Constitution permits court-ordered affirmative 
action to eliminate "the lingering effects of pervasive discrimination."56 
In this case, it was alleged that membership preferences were granted to 
non-white workers who had not been identified as victims of unlawful 
discrimination.57 The Supreme Court noted that the district court 
properly used statistical evidence to establish petitioner's non-white 
membership statistical goal under the affirmative action plan and 
47. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 ( 1979). 
48. Id. at 208-09. 
49. Id. at 197. 
50. Id. 
5 L I d. at 209. 
52. /d. 
53. Fullllovc v. Klutwick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980). 
54. /d. 
55. Id. at 453. In a plurality opinion, justice Burger noted Congress's remedial powers in this 
area. Id. at 483-84. 
56. Loca/28 ofSheet Metal Workers Tnt/. Assn. v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421,476 (1986). 
57. Td. at 455. 
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order.5s 
In a similar case, Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 59 the Supreme 
Court more narrowly defined its approach when it held that gender-
conscious plans applied to job categories in which minorities are 
traditionally underrepresented are acceptable. In Johnson, the 
transportation agency adopted a plan where sex was considered in 
promotions because women were underrepresented in such positions.60 
The Court upheld the plan because there was not only an imbalance of 
women but because the plan, like the plan in Weber, did not excessively 
harm men.61 Further, the Court reasoned that the plan seemed to have an 
end in sight.62 
Around this time, Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education63 was 
decided. Wygant was the only Supreme Court case dealing directly with 
faculty and diversity under the remedial interest argument. The Board of 
Education in Jackson, Michigan, developed a race-conscious layoff 
agreement with the local teachers' union.64 Under this plan, teacher 
seniority would govern if layoffs were necessary except that "at no time 
[would] there be a greater percentage of minority personnel laid off than 
the current percentage of minority personnel employed at the time of the 
layoff."65 When layoffs became necessary, the school district disregarded 
the race-conscious layoff agreement and laid off two minority teachers. 66 
The two teachers and the union brought suit under the Equal Protection 
Clause and the Civil Rights Act of 1964.67 In state court, the teachers 
prevailed on breach of contract and the school district's arguments were 
rejected.68 As a result of the state court decision, the school district began 
enforcing the race-conscious layoff plan. The laid-off non-minority 
teachers brought suit in federal court challenging the plan on both Title 
VII and Equal Protection grounds. 69 
The district court upheld the race-conscious layoff plan under an 
Equal Protection analysis as an attempt to remedy societal discrimination 
58. I d. at 440-42. 
59. Johnson v. Trunsp. Agency, 4RO U.S. 616 (1987). 
60. Id. at 620-21. 
61. Id. at 630. 
62. I d. at n39-40. 
63. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. ofEduc., 476 U.S. 267 ( 19S6). 
64. Id. at 270-71. 
65. Id. at 270. 
66. Id. at 271. 
ti7. Id. 
68. Jd. at 272. 
69. Id. 
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by providing minority role models in the classroom?0 The Sixth Circuit 
Court of Appeals affirmed; the Supreme Court granted certiorari on the 
Equal Protection Clause claim? 1 In a five-four decision, with five 
separate opinions, the Supreme Court reasoned that the school board's 
interest of providing black role models and remedying the societal 
discrimination that created historically white teaching staffs were not 
compelling.72 
\!\Then the Court examined the remedial argument, focus was placed 
on the prior discriminating practices of the school district. 73 Justice 
Powell stated in the plurality opinion that the "Court had insisted upon 
some showing of prior discrimination by the governmental unit involved 
before allowing limited use of racial classifications in order to remedy 
such discrimination. "74 He reasoned that the plan operated "against 
whites and in favor of certain minorities, and therefore constituted a 
classification based on race."75 Further, according to Justice Powell, a 
policy embracing racial preferences to create minority role models could 
not be upheld as legitimate?6 
Although the Supreme Court struck down the role model theory, it is 
arguable that a Court majority endorsed the constitutionality of faculty 
diversity as a goal. Justice O'Connor, in her concurrence, stated that 
"although its precise contours are uncertain, a state interest in the 
promotion of racial diversity has been found sufficiently 'compelling,' at 
least in the context of higher education, to support the use of racial 
consideration in furthering that interest."77 Justice Marshall, in his 
dissent joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun, stated that he would 
have upheld the school board's policy under the lower standard of 
intermediate scrutiny. 7H The dissent by Justice Stevens recognized the 
need for an integrated faculty, stating: "In the context of public 
education, it is quite obvious that a school board may reasonably 
conclude that an integrated faculty will be able to provide benefits to the 
student body that could not be provided by an all-white, or nearly all-
white, faculty."79 
70. /d. 
71. !d. at 27.1. 
n. /d. at 274-f\4 (pluralitv). 
73. ld. at 274. 
74. ld. 
75. !d. at 273. 
76. ld. at 274-76. 
77. !d. at 2f\6 (O'Connor, ]., concurring) (citing Justice Powell's opinion in Bukke, 438 U.S. at 
311-15) 
78. I d. at 301- 03 (MarshalL Brennan, & Blackmun, JJ., dissenting). 
79. !d. at :l15 (Stevens,]., dissenting). 
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Although the affirmative action plan was struck down in Wygant, 
another plan was upheld during this same time period. In United States v. 
Paradise, 80 the Supreme Court upheld a court -ordered promotion policy 
implemented because of a four-decade documented history of racial 
discrimination against blacks in the Alabama Department of Public 
Safety.81 Justice Brennan's plurality opinion stated that "[t)he 
Government unquestionably has a compelling interest in remedying past 
and present discrimination by a state actor."82 The Court did note, 
however, that the remedial plan should be "temporary in application."83 
When analyzing affirmative action policies, the Paradise Court 
considered the following five factors: the necessity for relief and the 
efficacy of alternative remedies; the use of a rigid racial quota or a flexible 
racial goal; the duration of the relief; the numerical goals; and the impact 
of the relief on third parties. 84 These factors may be weighed against each 
other and some may be more heavily relied upon than others.85 Justices 
Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Powell concluded that racial 
preferences could be used when the five factors were met. 86 Justice 
Stevens concurred on the grounds that the district court had equitable 
power to fashion a broad remedy in a particular case where a 
constitutional violation had been found.87 The Supreme Court also noted 
that the race-conscious promotion requirements were flexible because 
they could be waived if no qualified candidate was available.88 
After Paradise, there seemed to be a shift in the Court's affirmative 
action employment cases beginning with City of Richmond v. f.A. Croson 
Companl9 when the Court struck down a race-conscious program. In 
this case, Richmond had a contract set-aside program for minority-
owned businesses.90 This program required prime contractors to 
subcontract at least 30 percent of the dollar amount of each construction 
contract to minority-owned businesses.91 The Court held that because 
the city could not identify a broad need for remedial action in the area of 
80. U.S. v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987). 
HI. Sec Paradise v. Prescott, 585 F. Supp. 72, 74 (N.D. Ala. l'lll3), alfd, 767 1'.2d 1514 (lith 
Cir. 1%5), a[fd su/J nom. U.S. v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987). 
82. Paradise, 480 U.S. at 167 (plurality). 
S3. !d. at 178. 
84. /d. at 171-86. 
85. Jd. 
86. /d. 
87. Id. at 189-95 (Stevens,)., concurring). 
SS. !d. at 177 (plurality). 
89. City of Richmond v. ].A. Croson Co., 48S U.S. 469 (1989). 
90. Id. at 477-7S. 
9 I. I d. at 477. 
33] DIVERSITY IN HIGHER EDUCATION 43 
government contracts, the plan violated the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.92 According to the Court, the city's set-
aside program was not narrowly tailored and 93 unlike previous cases, 
there was not enough evidence of prior discriminationY4 
Given the lack of evidence demonstrating a need for a remedial plan, 
Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, stated that the consideration 
of race in such programs "may in fact promote notions of racial 
inferiority and lead to a politics of racial hostility."95 Accordingly, the 
Court noted that the consideration of race could be justified if the 
program operated to remedy past wrongs against a group. 96 However, 
the evidence of discrimination must be strong enough to demonstrate the 
government's need to remedy the discrimination: "[A] generalized 
assertion that there has been past discrimination in an entire industry 
provides no guidance for a legislative body to determine the precise scope 
of the injury it seeks to remedy."97 
The Court upheld a race-conscious plan based on a lower level of 
scrutiny in Metro Broadcasting v. Federal Communications 
Commission.98 In Metro Broadcasting, a Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) program sought to ensure viewpoint diversity by 
permitting television stations and radio stations to be controlled by 
minority-run companies.99 Specifically, in creating such a program, the 
FCC reasoned that a racially diverse group would lead to more diverse 
perspectives. 100 The FCC implemented this policy to " [enrich] and 
[educate] the non-minority audience." 101 In its lawsuit, Metro 
Broadcasting alleged that the policy violated the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 102 
Under intermediate review, the Court upheld the FCC's policies. The 
Court reasoned that "[t]he Commission's minority ownership policies 
bear the imprimatur of longstanding [sic] congressional support and 
92. Id. at 511. 
93. I d. at 505-08. 
94. I d. at 485. 
95. I d. at 493 (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 298). 
96. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 493. 
97. Id. at 498. The Croson Court also noted that race-neutral plans could have been explored 
and established. Sec id. at 509-10. 
98. Metro Broad. v. FCC .• 497 U.S. 547 (1990), overruled, Adarand, 515 U.S. 200 (l99S); Metro 
Broad was overruled to the extent that the Court incorrectly used mid-level scrutiny, instead of strict 
scrutiny. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227. 
99. 497 U.S. at 555. 
I 00. !d. at 5o6. 
101. Jd.556. 
I 02. /d. at SSS-60. 
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direction and are substantially related to the achievement of the 
important governmental objective of broadcast diversity." 103 For the 
majority, Justice Brennan stressed the importance of diversity in 
broadcasting and noted that it was a constitutionally permissible goal. 104 
The Court reasoned that racial classification would withstand 
intermediate scrutiny if it did not impose undue burdens on non-
minorities.105 Justice O'Connor's dissent reiterated her stance in Croson 
regarding the justification of race-based programs, stating that such 
programs are only acceptable if they operate to remedy past wrongs 
against a group. 106 
Again applying strict scrutiny, in Adarand Construction v. Pena, the 
Court rejected a plan whereby a company under a U.S. government 
contract would receive additional compensation if the company hired 
minority-owned subcontractors. 107 The contracts were obtained as a 
result of the Surface Transportation and Uniform Relocation Assistance 
Act of 1987. 108 The Act stated that "not less than I 0 percent" of the 
appropriated funds "shall be expended with small business concerns 
owned and controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged 
individuals." 109 The Court rejected the proposition that affirmative 
action was necessary in this particular situation, but did note that 
affirmative action could be permissible to remedy past discrimination. 110 
In striking down this affirmative action program, the majority opinion 
stated: "[t]he unhappy persistence of both the practice and the lingering 
effects of racial discrimination against minority groups in this country is 
an unfortunate reality, and government is not disqualified from acting in 
response to it." 111 Thus, Adarand shows that the Court did not strike 
down affirmative action policies in all cases. 
Before the Gratz and Grutter Supreme Court decisions, legal scholars 
argued over what type of influence the public employment affirmative 
action cases would have on education cases. After Grutter and Gratz, 
some scholars argue that the Supreme Court may choose to "uphold 
race-conscious policies in employment contexts that closely parallel the 
higher education context," or use race as a plus factor. 112 This line of 
103. !d. at 600. 
104. !d. at 568 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-13). 
105. !d. at 596-97 
106. !d. at 603 (O'Connor,)., dissenting). 
107. 505 U.S. at 201-06 (majority). 
108. Pub. L. No. 100-17,101 Stat. 132 (1987). 
109. 101 Stat. at 145. 
110. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 218-21. 
Ill. !d. at 237. 
112. See )oint Statement, supra n. I 0 ,\I 25. 
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reasoning would be consistent with Justice O'Connor's reasoning in 
Wygant and Grutter when she reiterated that higher education is 
different than employment. 
Evidence of past discrimination must be provided in order to meet 
the compelling state interest standard in public employment cases. 113 To 
satisfy this requirement, the government should have evidence of 
discrimination against each racial group included in the race-conscious 
policy. 114 For example, when the Croson Court struck down the race-
conscious policy, it did so because the city did not have enough evidence 
of discrimination to support the constitutional scrutiny required under 
the Equal Protection Clause. 115 Therefore, when a university uses a race-
conscious hiring plan to remedy past discrimination, the institution 
needs to have concrete evidence. 116 Some scholars argue that if a 
university cannot rely upon past societal discrimination as a basis for 
race-conscious policies, the university can "focus solely on present effects 
of past discrimination at that particular institution." 117 Concrete 
evidence would also be necessary in this situation. 
V. OTHER NOTAHLE RACE AND FACULTY CASES: WHAT Do THESE 
OUTCOMES ADVANCE? 
Although this paper focuses on Supreme Court holdings, there are 
other cases that address race-conscious hiring of faculty and teachers, 
including one federal circuit court of appeals case, 118 one federal district 
court case, 119 and one state supreme court case. 120 The circuit court case 
addressed affirmative action at the K-12 level, while the federal district 
court case and the state supreme court case addressed affirmative action 
at the university leve\. 121 
The federal circuit court case examined the issue of race-conscious 
employment practices to achieve teacher diversity. In Taxman v. Board of 
Education of the Township of Piscataway, a white high school teacher was 
laid off by the school board in favor of retaining a black teacher, who 
113. See Jeffrey M. Hanson, Hanging By Yarns' Dcjiciencies in Anecdotal Eviderzce Threaten the 
Survival of Race-Based Preference Programs/or Public Contracting, 88 Cornell L. Rev. 1433, 1435-38 
(2003). 
114. 488 U.S. at 506. 
115. !d. at 485 
116. !d. 
117. Alger,supran.31,at 192. 
118. Taxmarz v. Bd. o{Educ. of the Township of Piscataway, 91 F.3d 1547(3d Cir. 1996). 
119. Hmwdle v. U. of Vt. & St. Agric. College, 56 F. Supp. 2d 419 (D. Vt. 1999). 
120. U. & Community College, 930 P.2d at 733. 
121. Taxman, 91 F.3d 1547; Honadle, 56 F. Supp. 2d 419. 
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happened to be the only black teacher within that particular 
department. 122 The district court granted partial summary judgment for 
the plaintiffs Title VII claim holding that the school board's action was 
overly intrusive on the rights of non-minorities. 123 The Third Circuit 
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision but focused on and rejected the 
school board's non-remedial objective to maintain a diverse faculty as 
inconsistent with the intent of Title VII's prohibition of racial 
discrimination. The court reasoned that non-remedial objectives are not 
permissible grounds for a race-conscious employment plan under Title 
VII. The court, relying on United Steelworkers v. Weber124 and Johnson v. 
Transportation Agency, 125 reasoned that a plan must seek to rectify 
under-representation, not to promote diversity. 126 
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari; but due to a last-minute 
settlement, the case never reached the high court. 127 This would have 
been the first Supreme Court case to focus on faculty diversity as a 
compelling state interest. 128 
In Honadle v. University of Vermont and State Agricultural College, 
129 a professor applicant alleged reverse discrimination when the 
University used race as a hiring factor. The applicant moved for 
instatement to a position that the University filled with a minority 
candidate. 130 The court found that the University's affirmative action 
plan did not violate the Equal Protection Clause or Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act. 131 Specifically, the court reasoned that a fund used to give 
departments incentive to hire minorities was not problematic. 132 
Although the court refused to instate the denied applicant, the court did 
note that if the plaintiff could successfully prove that race influenced the 
decision to hire the minority employee, then the University's affirmative 
122. Taxman. 91 F.3d at 1551. 
123. U.S. v. Bd. ofi'.duc. of the Township of Piscataway. 832 f. Supp. 836,851 (D.N.f. 1993). 
124. 443 U.S. 139 ( 1979). 
125. 480 U.S. 616 (1987) 
126. Taxman. 91 F.3d at 1558. 
127. Cert. granted in Piscataway Township Bd. of Educ. V. Taxman, 521 U.S. 1117 ( 1997), cert. 
dismissed, 552 U.S. 10!0 (1997). 
128. Some scholars argue that this case was f(lrced to settlement by pro-affirmative action 
groups who feared that this was a weak test case and as such the Supreme Court would have struck 
down the school's affirmative action program. See Matthew S. Lerner, When Diversity Leads to 
Adversity: The Principles of Promoting Diversity in Educational Institutions, Premonitions of the 
Tax man v. Board of Education Settlement, 47 Buff. L. Rev. I 035, I 046-47 (1999). 
129. 56 f. Supp. 2d 419. 
130. Id. at 424-30. 
131. /d. at 425. 
132. Id. 
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action plan may have been unconstitutional. 133 
The Nevada Supreme Court addressed a case involving the issue of 
race-conscious hiring practices to achieve faculty diversity. In University 
and Community College System of Nevada v. Farmer, a white female 
professor alleged that the University discriminated against her when it 
hired a black professor. 134 The black immigrant professor from Uganda 
was hired under a special minority program that allowed a department to 
hire an additional faculty member if it hired a minority candidate. 135 
When hiring faculty, the University argued that it based its decision on 
the candidate's publications, teaching, subject specialization, educational 
background, and race. 136 
The Nevada Supreme Court upheld the University's race-conscious 
faculty hiring policy in order to achieve diversity and remedy the effect of 
an apparent racial imbalance in a traditionally segregated job category. 137 
The Court noted that at the time of this decision, almost 90 percent of the 
faculty was white. 138 The Court relied on Bakke and reasoned "[t]he 
University demonstrated that it has a compelling interest in fostering a 
culturally and ethnically diverse faculty. A failure to attract minority 
faculty perpetuates the University's white enclave and further limits 
student exposure to multicultural diversity." 139 Additionally, the Court 
stated that "[w]e also view the desirability of a racially diverse faculty as 
sufficiently analogous to the constitutionally permissible attainment of a 
racially diverse student body countenanced by the Bakke Court." 140 
Because the two candidates were fairly equal in merit, the University 
should have some discretion in making personnel decisions. 141 Although 
this case is only binding in Nevada, it demonstrates how universities rely 
on Bakke, and arguably on Grutter and Gratz, in finding faculty diversity 
a compelling interest. 
These cases are of particular importance because they demonstrate 
how the lower courts interpret diversity in employment regarding 
teachers and professors. It is unfortunate that these cases never reached 
the U.S. Supreme Court. Guidance is still needed in considering race 
when hiring university faculty. 
133. !d. at 425-30. 
134. 930 P.2d at 733. 
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4S B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL [2005 
Formerly, many institutions established affirmative action plans to 
remedy present dfects of past discrimination in faculty hiring. Some 
universities may now, as a result of Grutter and Gratz, seek to sustain 
these programs to achieve educational benefits of diversity. Therefore, 
even if one argues that narrowly defined vestiges of past discrimination 
have been eliminated at some institutions, the diversity rationale seen in 
these e<1ses remains an important justification for race-conscious faculty 
hinng as a matter of educational quality for the institution. 
VI. POLICY ARJ;UMENTS: SHOULD RACE BE CONSIDERED IN FACULTY 
HIRINC;? 
Although the arguments above focus on what is permissible under 
the law, there are several policy-based arguments that merit discussion. 
Two of these arguments are that a diverse faculty is related to important 
educational objectives and that diverse faculty members could serve as 
role models for both students and faculty. 
Universities arc premised upon the creation of a holistic learning 
environment as part of the institution's educational mission, promoting a 
sense ot community among faculty and students who engage in a "robust 
exchange of ideas" both inside and outside the classroom.142 One could 
argue that universities are institutions where people from diverse 
backgrounds come together to learn from one another. Some scholars 
believe that "racial and ethnic diversity among [university] faculty ... 
serves important educational objectives."143 For example, faculty 
members not only influence through teaching, but also through research, 
writmg, and service activities. Through these actions, a diverse faculty 
and teaching staff play a pivotal role in breaking down stereotypes and 
Improving race relations on campus and ultimately nationally. 144 
faculty members serve as important role models for students and 
faculty. Although the role model theory was dismissed in Wygant, there 
arc other issues to consider at a university. Under the faculty role model 
theory, when minority students witness minority faculty succeed, it may 
demonstrate to them that such achievement is possible in higher 
education. VVhitc students who have not regularly encountered members 
of minority groups in positions of authority may also benefit. 145 Diversity 
l ,L~. Sec Aig~T, ~upru n. 31, at 199. 
143 Set' id at l0·L 
l·Jl. Jd 
145. S,•c gmcral/y Paul Hrcst & ,'vliranda (hhige, Race and Remedy in a Multicultural Society: 
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at a university can raise cultural awareness for all involved. 146 
Furthermore, the presence of minority faculty tends to make students of 
color feel that they are welcome in the institution. A "critical mass" of 
people of color can be quite beneficial. 147 
The significance of faculty diversity does not depend on the "false 
notion that there is an essential voice of persons of color" or that a faculty 
member's race dictates his or her particular way of thinking about one 
subject. 148 Instead, the idea is that people of different races and 
ethnicities often have different life experiences that affect their relations 
with members of other groups and influence their views on the subjects 
they teach. 149 A professor's background impacts the way he or she 
perceives the world. Paul Brest and Miranda Oshige use the example that 
African Americans regularly encounter discrimination not experienced 
by whites. Expanding the Brest and Oshige arguments, imagine the 
difference between a class discussion on racial profiling in an all-white 
lecture and a similar class discussion in a racially diverse lecture. The 
discussions would be very different in each setting and arguably more 
fruitful in the latter setting. Brest and Oshige write: "Policies that seem 
'neutral' to a dominant group may have quite different meanings for 
members of other racial or ethnic groups. This has important 
implications both for the interpersonal and intellectual lives of students 
and faculty." 150 
Critics argue that consideration of race in faculty hiring equals 
reverse discrimination. 151 Other concerns, as mentioned in the Farmer 
dissent, involve how affirmative action plans consider faculty of mixed-
ancestry or minority immigrant faculty members. In Farmer, it could be 
argued that the black professor, as an immigrant, was never 
disadvantaged by past discrimination. Under this reasoning, the remedial 
argument present in the public employment cases would not apply. After 
Adarand, one could argue that a university's motive in considering race 
in faculty hiring does not meet the requisite standard that remedies be 
narrowly tailored to address specific instances of past discrimination. 
However, it is equally arguable that professors who have lived abroad 
would certainly contribute to the learning environment on campuses. 
Currently, most data is in regard to student body diversity. But, some 
146. See generally Alexander W. Astin, What Matters in College? Four Critical Year.< Revisited, 
(Jossey-Bass 1992) (reviewing the college satisfaction experiences of20,000 students). 
147. Sec Brest, supra n. 145, at 856 n. 4. 
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of the arguments for student body diversity could extend to maintaining 
a diverse faculty. 152 Jonathan Alger, counsel to the American Association 
of University Professors, notes that the presence of a diverse faculty can 
enhance the learning opportunities for white students, but recognizes 
there is little data to prove such a claim. 153 Alger does, however, note that 
researchers are currently studying diversity at the campus and national 
levels. 154 In a survey of current research on diversity, the Association of 
American Colleges and Universities reported that diversity initiatives 
positively affect both minority and white students on campus. 155 These 
studies indicate that "diversity initiatives have an impact not only on 
student attitudes and feelings toward inter-group relations on campus, 
but also on institutional satisfaction, involvement, and academic 
growth." 156 Alger suggests that in future research, "the link between 
educational quality and legal standards must be explored and articulated 
in a manner that courts will understand and accept if race-conscious 
affirmative action programs are to survive."157 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Most progressive educational systems seek to support a diverse 
faculty and to provide an educational setting that encourages diversity. 
Oftentimes, universities adopt affirmative action programs in faculty 
hiring. Some universities implement such programs to remedy past 
discrimination, while other universities implement these plans to 
increase diversity. Whatever the underlying purpose for the affirmative 
action plan, there are different legal issues to consider. If a university 
seeks a diverse faculty under the principles articulated in Grutter and 
Gratz, questions remain as to whether this line of reasoning extends to 
faculty hiring. Alternately, if the university seeks to remedy past 
discrimination, the public employment cases dictate the need to 
152. For instance, the Harvard Civil Rights Project demonstrated that students graduating 
from higher-tier law schools "experienced powerful education experiences from interaction with 
students of other races." See Gary Orfield & Dean Whitla, Diversity and Legal Education: Student 
Experiences in Leading Law Schools, in Diversity Challenged: Evidence of the Impact of Affirmative 
Action 143, 172 (Gary Orfield & Michal Kurlaender eds., Harvard Educ. Publg. Group 2001). Their 
research also found that exposure to diverse student bodies permitted the white law students to have 
an improved understanding of the critical dimensions of their profession. !d. 
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assiduously document past forms of discrimination to each particular 
group. Until the Supreme Court gives further guidance on faculty 
diversity, some universities will continue to use race as a factor in faculty 
hiring to increase faculty diversity or to remedy past discrimination. 
